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Abstract
This paper argues that the Social Security OASDI Trust Fund is widely misunderstood by the
public, thereby corrupting the debate on how to handle future scheduled benefits, and increasing
the risk of program changes that would not be accepted if people understood how the program
functions. The Trust Fund is a fiscal nullity but appears to be regarded by many as essential, hence
the public debate is about how to “fix” it, rather than about the moral question of whether to fund
scheduled benefits, which are clearly affordable. This misunderstanding indicates the need for a
shift in emphasis in public descriptions of the program. For this, this paper lays out a set of data,
arguments and analogies that are asserted to be accurate representations of the OASDI program
and Trust Fund operation, and which are proposed as tools for public education. Finally, this paper
argues that an important step in shifting public debate is to re-institute full recourse to Treasury
funding for any payroll tax shortfall, which will force the public debate back to benefit levels and
revenue sources.
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1. Introduction
The Social Security OASDI (Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance) program has been the
subject of much debate concerning the ability of society to afford it, with a majority of Americans
believing it has serious problems [AARP 2010, Altman 2005, Helman 2011 and WP 2011]. Central
to this debate has been the condition of the OASDI Trust Fund (hereafter, the “TF”). It is officially
made a central issue by the annual issuance of the Trustees Report on the condition of the TF. Its
primary purpose is reporting the TF status, and it emphasizes that when the TF is exhausted, only
part of scheduled benefits will be paid, making TF importance explicit.
The debate over the relevance of the TF is well known. Supporters correctly argue that benefits will
be paid out of the TF just like any other fund [Altman 2010], while others correctly point out that
there are no income-producing assets in the TF [Bartlett 2011]. Both of these are true, leading to the
Trust Fund Paradox: that it is not needed but benefits will still be paid (up to a point) even when
there is a payroll tax shortfall. The answer to the paradox is that the TF actually is not fiscally
needed: it is merely budget authority for the pay-as-you-go cash stream that is normal for most
government benefits, and the cash stream is adequate. This cash stream is primarily the payroll tax,
which Social Security Administration (SSA) has unlimited access to, and general Treasury funds to
make up any shortfall, for which the SSA has only limited access to. The only relevance of the TF
is to provide the legally necessary budget authority for access to Treasury funding, up to a limit (its
notional balance). The bonds in the TF are merely chits: they have value to the OASDI program in
that they can be exchanged for money from Treasury, but they are of no value in helping Treasury
procure this money.
The ability to pay scheduled benefits is strictly a matter of collecting the necessary tax revenue;
no revenue-producing assets exist that can help. Yet the general public almost certainly does not
understand this, otherwise surveys would not show that it is worried about “bankruptcy” and that
the system needs to be “fixed.” This is a critical point for public debate, as arguments about
TF “insolvency” can be used to press for changes that may not be agreed to if people understood
how the program and the TF actually work. (To quote Baker, “As a result of a steady stream of
misinformation, the public could possibly allow a program that it values immensely to be seriously
undermined or dismantled.” [Baker 1999])
The effect of the TF is to arbitrarily cap the collective benefit payment level to that of future
current-period payroll tax revenue, regardless of scheduled benefits (i.e., those specified in the annual
statements sent to OASDI participants). Thus the TF is not a fiscal device at all, but (combined
with a future payroll tax rate) rather is a moral judgement: that, no matter what the statements
say, beneficiaries do not deserve what they are scheduled. Effectively, a stealth claim is being made
of “moral unaffordability” (we should not pay) by stating it as a claim of fiscal unaffordability (we
can not pay). By mistaking a moral judgement for a fiscal problem, the public is permitting a moral
question to be turned into a fiscal one, shielding the moral issue from proper scrutiny. Hence the
position of this paper is that the TF should be ignored so that the entire debate on paying scheduled
benefits can center on the moral issue of whether we should pay.
In general, no good decisions about an issue can be made unless those with a stake understand the
issue. Good decisions are particularly unlikely if the concern revolves around issues that are not
relevant (TF solvency and bankruptcy) and skirts the one that is (how much tax). To this end,
this paper expands on the argument that the public misunderstands the TF, and presents a number
of arguments, analogies and data that are proposed to be accurate and useful as tools for public
education. Note that this argument is about where the debate should be; the morality debate itself
is not entered here, so issues of fairness (i.e., [Diamond 2004]) in the tax and benefit structure are
not addressed.
In additional to not understanding the TF, it is likely that the public also does not understand that
the required taxes are affordable. (Affordability means that the program could easily be funded
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if desired, mostly a technical question. Being affordable is not the same as wanting to fund it, a
political and moral question.) Given the likely public concept of what a trust fund is, a logical
response to the idea of the TF running out would be simply “why not refill it?” Since the public
perception is that the program is in serious trouble, it is a reasonable conclusion that the public’s
answer to this question is “because we cannot afford to.” So, even though affordability should be
obvious, a set of data and arguments for public use will be proposed here, so that the paper is a
more complete package of education tools.
Section 2 briefly reviews relevant aspects of the OASDI program and the TF, for readers not familiar
with the program. Section 3 presents arguments that the public misunderstands how the TF works.
Section 4 proposes various analogies useful for public education on how the TF works. Affordability
arguments are presented in Section 5.
2. Review of Relevant Aspects of the OASDI Program and
the Trust Fund
The OASDI program is, and has been, a pay-as-you-go benefit program that is usually described as an
insurance program (although the main program, Old Age, is not similar to any private insurance).
There are two fundamental components of interest here, the benefit and revenue schedules. The
schedule of benefits is set by law as a function of the beneficiary’s earning history, without regard to
OASDI funding at the time of payment. While benefits are proportional to earnings, there are two
“bend points” in the curve, so lower income workers get a higher percentage of their pay replaced
than higher income ones. The funding schedule, originally, and primarily, is a flat tax on a worker’s
W-2 income, up to a limit. From 1943 to 1950 the OASDI program had full recourse to Treasury for
any shortfall from the payroll tax, but that has been removed [Altman 2005]. Presently, the Social
Security Administration (SSA) has no authority to borrow or to increase tax rates on its own, so
its ability to pay benefits is limited by its income, not determined by what it is scheduled to pay
out. It is presumed that if income is lacking, and lacking a sudden change in the law, only partial
benefits will be paid. So the issue regarding the revenue vs. the benefit schedules is what happens
if scheduled benefits exceed payroll tax revenues at any time.
This problem is supposed to be solved by the TF. All revenue flows into the TF, and program
expenses are paid out of the TF. This solves short-term mismatches between inflow and outflow
by providing a buffer. In addition, the payroll tax was increased to a level higher than required
for current benefits at the time. This excess revenue “accumulated” in the TF, but in reality, all
excess payroll tax revenue was immediately spent by Treasury, with the promise to repay it in the
future as it is needed, with interest. This “saving” is implemented with special government bonds,
which cannot be sold to the public. When the OASDI program suffers a shortfall in the payroll tax
(which commenced in 2010 and is predicted to continue to the horizon) it redeems bonds from the
TF through Treasury. This of course must be done primarily through the income tax.
Hence all OASDI costs are covered on a pay-as-you-go basis through a combination of payroll and
income taxes. The Social Security Trustees Report [SSA 2012b] states that the income tax share
will rise to around 25% in the early 2030’s and that thereafter, the payroll tax will continue to cover
around 75% of scheduled benefits. The only catch is that this recourse to Treasury (the income tax)
is limited by the amount of excess payroll taxes collected in the past (plus interest). Once this limit
is reached, access to the income tax is cut off, and benefits become limited by current payroll tax
revenue once again.
Note that the use of the TF and the past rise in payroll taxes above the level of costs has a non-
obvious effect. It did not create any asset that can produce future value without recourse to the
income tax. Rather, it merely transferred part of the funding for past general programs to the
payroll tax, in exchange for a future (i.e., now) transfer of part of the funding of OASDI benefits to
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the income tax. In a sense this has smoothed the use of the regressive payroll tax over time, keeping
it at a constant level over a longer period, while the income tax burden varies as necessary.
Also note that there is no net “hump” in costs due to the baby boom, so the past increase in payroll
tax cannot serve to smooth this non-existent hump. See Table 1 column 4, the total OASDI program
cost as a percentage of GDP. If only a baby boom hump were involved, costs should (approximately)
start increasing in 2011 and then revert to the 2010 level sometime in the 2050 to 2060 range, as the
last boomers die. Yet the costs climb steadily until 2035, about the middle of an 85 year life span
for the boomers, and are then stable out to the horizon, long after they are all dead. There is no
pig in the python.
Note that the TF might be said to prefund benefits, to prevent the transfer of part the burden
of funding benefits to other generations, but this is not the case. Conceptually, future retirees
prefunded some of their retirement by over-paying in payroll tax yesterday. In reality, all future
benefits are paid for directly and immediately by workers and taxpayers of that time only. There
is no direct or fiscal prefunding, only a possible moral prefunding. It is true that past workers still
contributed to society by paying more in payroll tax than was required for then-current benefits, but
they were simply paying taxes that needed to be paid anyway, one way or another. They could have
just as well paid more in income or other taxes. In any case, all the money was spent on the spot.
The TF only enters into this as an accounting mechanism to tell how much future taxpayers should
pay in recognition of past payments by workers of regressive payroll taxes. Effectively, a component
of past tax paying is being marked as “additional suffering” that warrants payback in the form of
“additional suffering” by future generations, where “suffering” refers to use of the regressive payroll
tax instead of the progressive income tax. But functionally it is all merely current-period taxes.
There has also been an argument that these “additional” taxes constituted a store of value by leading
to an ultimately stronger economy [Smetters 2004]. The claimed mechanism is that they increased
national saving because legislators treated “excess” payroll taxes differently from additional income
taxes. Regardless of the merit of this argument, it should be clear that the TF played no essential
role here: any action that increased national saving would have had the same effect. But, excess
payroll taxes are (with current law) gone forever, so right or wrong, this argument is moot.
3. Public Misunderstanding
A basic argument of this paper is that the general public does not understand the function of the
OASDI TF. Direct evidence of this is lacking, as surveys are not quizzing people on the details of
TF function, but rather on their overall view of the OASDI program. However, there is significant
indirect evidence of this misunderstanding. This is a problem to the extent that people believe the
TF is more important than it is, even if it need not be any more than it actually is in order to
cause payment of benefits. The primary concern is that proper debate cannot be held unless the
debaters understand what they are dealing with. The following presents evidence to support the
idea of general public misunderstanding, using various arguments.
3.1. Surveys
According to a Kaiser Family Foundation survey, 70% of respondents believe that Social Security will
go “bankrupt” if nothing is done [KFF 2005]. This shows a clear misunderstanding of the program,
as a pay-as-you-go tax-funded government benefit program cannot go bankrupt, it can only be
modified or shut down. This is a political question, not a fiscal one. According to a Washington
Post/ABC News poll [WP 2011], 81% of respondents believe that if changes are not made, the
Social Security system is heading for a crisis. 66% of these believe that major, as opposed to minor,
changes are required. Most Americans clearly believe that the Social Security system is in trouble
and needs to be “fixed.” This would not be the case if it were merely a question of “shall we pay
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the scheduled benefits we have promised?” The mere fact that all survey questions refer to the state
of a system indicates that the idea that the entire problem is a moral one is not even registering.
People apparently believe that their benefit stream depends on the TF in a fiscal manner, and they
are mistaken.
3.2. SSA FAQ
The SSA website has a history FAQ, where question 23 is “Has Social Security ever been financed
by general tax revenues?,” and the brief answer is “Not to any significant extent.” There is a more
detailed explanation in [SSA 2012a]. This describes three instances of the use of general revenues
for SSA funding: credit bonuses for military personnel; special benefits for those who were age 72
before 1971 (presumably deceased by now); and starting with the 1983 amendments, partial income
taxes on Social Security benefits. The last item is called “the third and last source of general revenue
financing of Social Security.”
Clearly missing is the fact that current TF bond redemptions are funded by general revenue. (The
web page may or may not be up to date, but this is not relevant, as this is the information available to
the public.) So while the “no significant” use of general revenues may be correct from an accounting
standpoint by SSA methods, this is clearly not correct on a cash flow basis. Since it is cash flow
that determines the affordability of benefits, information such as this is misleading.
There is a similar issue with the “Young Person’s Guide” put out by the National Academy for Social
Insurance [Edwards 2012]. In the description of program funding, they state: “Social Security is
the only major program in the federal budget that is funded entirely by dedicated revenue sources.”
Again, this conflates moral accounting with fiscal cash flow, contributing to a misleading picture on
affordability.
3.3. The Dedicated Tax
The payroll tax is described as a “dedicated tax,” legally only to be used for Social Security benefits.
This widespread description may also be adding to an attitude environment that makes it difficult
to understand that higher benefits are affordable. To quote Krugman [Krugman 2005]:
If Ronald Reagan had said, back in the 1980s, “Let’s increase a regressive tax that
falls mainly on the working class, while cutting taxes that fall mainly on much
richer people,” he would have faced a political firestorm. But because the increase
in the regressive payroll tax was recommended by the Greenspan Commission to
support Social Security, it was politically in a different box — you might even call
it a lockbox — from Reagan’s tax cuts.
What we are doing right now, by redeeming TF bonds through the income tax, is to increase the
income tax burden so as not to increase the regressive payroll tax. Permitting the TF to “run out”
and not continue to replace the funding through the income tax will effectively be to do as Reagan
did, except that instead of raising the regressive payroll tax to finance the income tax cut, we will
be cutting Social Security benefits instead. Krugman’s two points are still valid: that the action
would be unacceptable if understood in this way, and hence that the understanding matters a great
deal.
However, surveys show that people are worrying about “bankruptcy” and “fixing” the system, not
raising a political firestorm over proposed future cuts. Clearly they do not understand the TF
“running out” as a benefit cut paying for a tax cut, although that is the proper fiscal interpretation.
One can conclude a lack of public understanding of the TF.
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3.4. Collective Bargaining Pension System
Consider a collective bargaining process whereby a pension system is being established. By definition
a pension represents deferred compensation, especially if money is being set aside in the present but
could instead be paid now. In this case the union has to weigh the value of the future compensation
against the risk that it will never be paid. Consider what the union prefers as a means of ensuring
that the payments will be made 20 or 30 years in the future. Certainly not a pay-as-you-go system.
They would want a trust fund, but funded by what? Formal IOUs? Company stock? Stock for an
industry index? A diversified portfolio of stock and bond total index funds? Clearly the options
become more appealing to the union as we work further down the list, mostly described by the
single word “correlation.” The union wants something as uncorrelated as possible with the future
fortunes of the company. It is a reasonable assumption that workers intuitively understand this
concept of a trust fund, even if they do not mathematically understand correlation. They want their
deferred compensation regardless of what happens to the company, and they believe the trust fund
is necessary to protect themselves. The TF is manifestly not necessary for the payment of scheduled
OASDI benefits. The correlation coefficient to the cash stream is 1, which is not what most people
would expect of a trust fund system.
3.5. Risk
It is likely that people feel that the concept of a trust fund implies low(er) risk, as the risk of a
pay-as-you-go system not delivering is the very thing they are trying to avoid. When great effort is
expended to reassure people that the TF is “there,” there is a clear implication that the normal cash
flow mechanism is risky in some sense, otherwise there would be no need for the allegedly lower-risk
trust fund. But the fiscal risks are the same since the funding mechanisms are the same. The only
risk is political, and again, the TF is not properly understood.
3.6. Popular Descriptions
Consider this episode of “Room For Debate” from the online version of The New York Times
[NYT 2011], concerning the TF: The box referring to the main section has this description: “No
deception is involved, but the system uses money from new investors to pay earlier investors. How
is it different from a Ponzi scheme?” While the authors clearly dismiss the idea that a Ponzi scheme
is involved, the text clearly states that money is being “invested,” and raising Ponzi addresses fears
that the money is being “stolen.” Both imply a store of assets that is not present. A later sentence
is: “Social Security will not become a pure pay-as-you-go system until 2036 ...”. This also implies
that assets are involved and is clearly not true. Hence a main paper of record is lately publishing
comments that reinforce the basic TF misunderstanding.
3.7. What Happens at “Run Out” Time
Consider figures II.D2 (p. 11) and II.D4 (p. 13) of the 2012 Trustees Report. These show that
scheduled benefits as a percentage of taxable payroll and GDP are approximately stable from about
2030 onwards. Since the TF is currently estimated to last until approximately 2033, and since it is
merely a conduit for pay-as-you-go Treasury funding, benefits will already be fully and stably funded
through a combination of payroll and income taxes for several years before the TF is exhausted. This
means that once benefits reach their stable level, full benefits are either impossible at any time (even
with the current TF balance), or possible without additional burden out to the horizon, without
regard to the TF. (Note that the Trustee’s Report states that the problem occurs when the TF runs
out, not before that time, so no claim is being made that the payroll/income tax burden of the early
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2030s cannot be met.) Anyone who believes that the TF “running out” means that benefits cannot
be afforded, especially those worried about “bankruptcy,” clearly does not understand this.
Since benefits will already be paying out using the 75%/25% payroll/income tax revenue mix, nothing
actually runs out, rather, there will be a cut in benefits and hence need for revenue. There is no
reason to cut benefits unless some other party is to receive that 25%. Regardless of whether this is
direct or indirect (by funding a different program) in the long run this amounts to an income tax
cut. So the net effect would be to reduce scheduled benefits for retirees in order to give a tax cut to
those who pay income taxes, which are not the lower earners. If people understood that an option
so stark was on the table, surveys would be making this explicit. From the published surveys it
looks doubtful that this point is understood.
3.8. Summary
The sum of these arguments is that if everyone clearly understood how the Social Security program
and its TF work, many people might consider that they have been sold a significant misrepresentation
of the system. Since the current understanding emphasizes problems with assets, whereas the real
issue is strictly a political and moral one of whether to pay scheduled benefits, some people could feel
that they are being deliberately mislead in order to gain acceptance of modifications that they would
not otherwise agree to. Since the TF has no fiscal function, this is a good reason to discontinue its
use in public discourse.
4. Analogies
Given that the TF is clearly not fiscally required for the payment of OASDI benefits, but that the
public believes it is, a basic issue is what tools can be used to help explain TF operation. This
section proposes a number of analogies, which are asserted to be accurate representations of the TF,
and may be useful as education tools. In particular, they avoid the direct use of financial language
such as bonds, IOUs, etc., which clearly have not done the job of enhancing public understanding.
4.1. TF Bonds as Chits
A recurring issue is the value of the TF bonds, as described in the introduction. The Trust Fund
Paradox is undoubtably confusing to people, as the language used clearly implies that a traditional
trust fund is in use. But the bonds are clearly not normal ones, as they cannot be sold, so calling
them bonds can be misleading. They are more accurately described as “chits.”
To better define a chit, consider a chit system used for a toolroom in a machine shop. A machinist
can get use of any tool required, but is not permitted to keep them. Rather, a tool is drawn from the
toolroom when needed and returned when the work is done. To ensure return, a chit is required, and
each worker has some number of chits, but does not need to pay for them. (This example assumes
that no crimes are being attempted, the chits guard only against carelessness and hoarding.) The
chit clearly has great value to the worker: no chits, no tools, no work, no job. But the chit has no
other value to the worker. It cannot be traded for lunch, used to pay rent, etc. It has no value to
the toolroom either: it cannot be used to buy the tool from the supplier, that must have already
happened, using real money. A chit for food from the company cafeteria is similar, but it has even
less than no value to the cafeteria: they must serve food of value but for no money from the worker,
eating the cost from some budget.
This exactly describes the special bonds in the TF. They represent a call on the income tax via
Treasury, and hence are clearly of value to the OASDI program. But they cannot be sold on the
market, by either the SSA or Treasury, so they have no intrinsic value. The only way for SSA to get
money is to turn in the bond and for Treasury to pay from the income tax. The bond is of no help
7
to Treasury to get this money. (Even if Treasury could sell them to the public, they are Treasury
Bonds and Treasury would still have to pay when they mature.)
So the TF bonds should really be spoken of as chits, which could be issued freely as long as there is
a willingness to collect the income tax (in the future) that they represent.
4.2. The Two Garden Hoses
Consider attempting to water a front lawn, which requires a certain water flow. Further, the flow
required increases in early summer, as it gets hotter, and levels off for the bulk of the summer. The
house has a huge service size and can supply water at a far higher rate than required for the lawn.
However, the front faucet pipe is small, and can only supply enough flow for spring, and about 75%
of that required for summer. So a hose is run to the back faucet and both are connected to the
sprinkler. The front is turned on full and the back is turned on more and more as required, but is
never anywhere near full open.
There is a catch. The backyard goblin believes he owns water coming from the back faucet, and is
not willing to part with an arbitrary amount. So he puts a meter in the hose line, and after a while,
shuts off the valve for good, even though there is plenty of capacity serving the entire house.
The house water service is the US economy, the front faucet is the payroll tax, the back faucet
is the income tax, and the meter represents the TF balance. The goblin represents a decision to
refuse to permit the income tax to pay 25% of OASDI scheduled benefits past a certain point. The
apparent arbitrariness of the goblin represents the current use of the TF balance as a cutoff point.
The question for the lawn is where to send the back faucet water, not whether it is available, and
the same holds for scheduled OASDI benefits: they are affordable, the only question is whether to
pay them.
4.3. The Water Treatment Plant and the Water Tank
This analogy gets more directly to the function of the TF itself, and probably closely matches
people’s notion of what a trust fund is like. The heart of the matter is that people probably perceive
a trust fund to be something that can supply cash flow in spite of the loss of the original source
of revenue. Here a water tank is used as an analogy for a trust fund, to supply a constant flow
even if original production ceases. Water plant analogies are used to compare a generic deferred
compensation scheme to a private pension plan and the OASDI program. In Figures 1 to 3 a water
treatment plant produces drinking water instead of cash flow. It has provision for selling water for
current consumption, or selling it now but for later delivery, or deferred consumption.
Figure 1 shows a basic system. Two pipes leave the plant, one going to “current consumption” and
one to “deferred consumption.” The valve marked “management” represents the ability to curtail
the latter. As long as the plant has sufficient capacity, and management is not greedy, the deferred
water is supplied. If the plant ceases to function, the promised deferred water is not delivered, even
though it has been paid for. This is a significant concern for anyone considering paying now for
deferred consumption.
Figure 2 is the analogy for a traditional private pension plan, where the water tank is the solution
to a lack of confidence in future delivery. Here a branch line from “current consumption,” still with
a valve to represent choice in funding, adds water to the tank. The line to “deferred consumption”
can be supplied indirectly from the plant (through the tank) or from the tank alone. Part of current
output is stored, so, given sufficient tank holdings, the promised deferred water can be delivered
even if the plant were to disappear. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) “plant” can
also deliver water to the deferred customers, with the valve representing possible limits on covered
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benefits. To the extent that we believe that PBGC obligations will ultimately be backed by the
Federal government, this PBGC “plant” is the entire US economy.
Figure 3 is the analogy for the OASDI program. The “plant” is the entire US economy. There are
two pipes leading to the “Y” that supplies the “benefits” group. The first is current cash flow, as
in a traditional pay-as-you-go system. It has a valve on it, representing the limits of current-period
payroll tax revenue. The other pipe comes from Treasury (income tax) and is the “trust fund,” but
there is no tank, it leads back to the same plant. This is because Treasury cannot redeem TF bonds
without resort to the income tax, as discussed before. The meter and valve on this pipe represent
the notional balance in the TF; when the meter hits zero, the valve is closed, but the capacity of the
plant (economy) is not affected and could continue producing at its previous rate without regard
to the meter. There is a valve on the final output pipe, representing the fact that benefits can be
changed in any way at any time. OASDI payments can be made only from revenue taxed from the
economy, regardless of whether this comes from the payroll or income tax.
There is manifestly no tank in the OASDI system, so the OASDI program is accurately represented
by Figure 3, not Figure 2. The TF misunderstanding is that the public perception is the opposite,
that the TF is analogous to Figure 2 rather than Figure 3. When the public is concerned about
“bankruptcy,” it believes there is a “tank,” that it will run dry, and that there is no way to refill
it. The counter-argument is that what is perceived as the tank and the “fill faucet” are really the
income tax, that the “faucet” is already cracked, and can be easily turned on much harder.
4.4. Hot Water Heaters
A simplified alternative to the water supply analogy is a tank vs. tankless hot water heater, where
the “product” is hot water. In a tank hot water heater, water can be continuously heated as it flows
through the tank, but only at a limited rate. If the entire tank has been preheated, hot water can be
withdrawn at a much higher rate, but only up to a limited quantity. Then the tank “runs out” and
the rate is again restricted. A tankless heater has a maximum rate with no ability to exceed, but
generally a higher rate than a tank heater once the tank has been emptied of its preheated water.
A tank hot water heater is the proper analogy for a trust fund benefit system. Pre-funding of the
trust fund represents water preheated in the tank. The continuous heating rate represents the future
pay-as-you-go capability, while exceeding that rate represents the temporary ability of the tank to
supply flow beyond that continuous rate. If the burner fails, analogous to failure of the company
funding the benefits, the tank can supply a limited quantity thereafter. This is likely to be the
analogy understood by people thinking of a trust fund.
A tankless heater is analogous to a pay-as-you-go benefit system. It must be capable of supplying
the maximum required flow, but supplies nothing if it fails. The proper analogy for the OASDI
system is a pair of parallel tankless heaters. The larger heater represents the payroll tax, and has a
maximum capacity of 75% of the maximum load. The smaller heater represents the income tax, and
can carry the rest of the load. Importantly, the fuel supply (analogous to the economy) is adequate
for both heaters at full load.
The basic misunderstanding of the TF is that it is being described, and understood, as a tank heater,
when there is actually no tank. This can explain why the public will accept the claim that the TF
“run out” must reduce benefits. The previous payment of excess payroll taxes is understood as filling
the tank with preheated water, which is now being drained. People understand that once the tank
runs out of hot water, it can never be re-heated if the shower cannot be turned off. Hence, the claim
of a necessity of benefit cuts makes sense. The reality of the parallel tankless heaters supplies the
counter-argument, by showing that the “run out” claim is equivalent to deciding that the smaller
heater shall be turned off merely to reduce the fuel bill.
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5. Affordability Arguments and Data
The main premise of this paper, that the public misunderstands the TF and hence is debating the
wrong aspects of the program, implicitly rests on the assumption that the program is affordable.
“Affordable” means that we can choose to have it if we want. This would not the case if a reasonable
projection of the cost is, say, 100% of GDP. Affordability of scheduled benefits is obvious in that
the program cost is currently 5% of GDP, and is predicted to rise to a peak of around 6.4%, then
settle to around 6% to the horizon. Since the US is currently one of the most lightly taxed countries
in the OECD, an increase in transfer payments by 1% of GDP is clearly manageable. (This is not
a claim that the decision to do this is obvious, only that it is obviously affordable, so that we can
freely choose to pay, or not.)
However, given the large part of the population that believes that the program is in trouble and
needs a major fix, it is not clear that this affordability is obvious to them. Since a likely public
understanding of the TF is that there is a tank, the belief that the system is in trouble implies a
belief that refilling the tank is not affordable. Since there is no tank, this is the same as a belief in
general unaffordability. Hence, this section presents a number of arguments that are proposed as
being useful for public education on this component.
In the following, unless otherwise specified, data comes from the 2012 Trustees Report (hereafter, the
“TR”), prepared based on 2011, using the intermediate assumptions [SSA 2012b]. This is consistent
with general practice, as the TR lays out the generally accepted parameters for evaluating the overall
program. (While the disability insurance portion is not a subject of this paper, it is frequently lumped
with OAS in reports, so this is done here. On a cost basis, DI was about 18% of the OASDI cost in
2011.)
5.1. General Data
Table 1 column 4 gives the projected total OASDI cost as a percentage of GDP, from TR Table
VI.F4 (TR p. 197).
This is projected to rise from the current level of 5.0% to about 6.4% in 2035, decline to 6.1% by
2050, and to remain between 6.0% and 6.1% through 2090. This is a maximum increase of about
1.4 percentage points of GDP, about a quarter increase in the OASDI share of GDP. For the steady
state level, this is a 1 percentage point increase, a fifth of the OASDI share. For reference, the
projected GDP and costs are given in billions of 2011 dollars in columns 2 and 3. The nominal GDP
is from TR Table VI.F4 and this is adjusted to 2012 by using the “Adjusted CPI” column from TR
Table VI.F6 (TR p. 202). From Table 2, total federal spending in 2011 was around 24% of GDP, so
an additional 1-1.4 percentage points would be manageable.
5.2. Continuity
This argument is one of continuity across the boundary of the TF running out. Before access to
Treasury funding is cut off, the OASDI program will already be at approximately peak cost as a
percentage of payroll and GDP, using approximately a 75%/25% payroll to Treasury funding mix,
the same mix that will prevail out to the horizon. Since there is no fiscal change across this boundary,
either the benefits can or cannot be paid, identically before and after. The warnings about the TF
balance are what happens when it “runs out.” The TR does not have any warnings about not being
able to redeem TF bonds, and supporters appear to exclusively state that the bonds are “good.” It
is clearly held that the program will pay scheduled benefits with the 75/25 mix into the 2030’s, so
the logical conclusion is that they can be continued out to the horizon.
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OASDI Program Costs
% Taxable Income
Using HI Base
Year GDP (B$) Cost (B$) %GDP Current 1.26 1.21
2012 $15,757 $789 5.01% 13.83% 10.98% 11.43%
2013 $16,130 $816 5.06% 13.95% 11.07% 11.53%
2014 $16,635 $847 5.09% 13.98% 11.10% 11.55%
2015 $17,233 $879 5.10% 13.97% 11.09% 11.55%
2016 $17,812 $910 5.11% 13.94% 11.06% 11.52%
2017 $18,332 $942 5.14% 13.91% 11.04% 11.50%
2018 $18,808 $976 5.19% 13.96% 11.08% 11.54%
2019 $19,178 $1,013 5.28% 14.13% 11.21% 11.68%
2020 $19,513 $1,050 5.38% 14.37% 11.40% 11.88%
2021 $19,847 $1,090 5.49% 14.65% 11.63% 12.11%
2025 $21,235 $1,251 5.89% 15.88% 12.60% 13.12%
2030 $23,083 $1,443 6.25% 17.01% 13.50% 14.06%
2035 $25,182 $1,602 6.36% 17.41% 13.82% 14.39%
2040 $27,527 $1,737 6.31% 17.36% 13.78% 14.35%
2045 $30,069 $1,867 6.21% 17.19% 13.64% 14.21%
2050 $32,746 $2,004 6.12% 17.08% 13.56% 14.12%
2055 $35,595 $2,164 6.08% 17.09% 13.56% 14.12%
2060 $38,681 $2,344 6.06% 17.16% 13.62% 14.18%
2065 $42,063 $2,541 6.04% 17.20% 13.65% 14.21%
2070 $45,724 $2,762 6.04% 17.33% 13.75% 14.32%
2075 $49,676 $3,000 6.04% 17.46% 13.86% 14.43%
2080 $53,926 $3,268 6.06% 17.60% 13.97% 14.55%
2085 $58,472 $3,561 6.09% 17.79% 14.12% 14.70%
2090 $63,374 $3,885 6.13% 17.98% 14.27% 14.86%
Table 1. OASDI program costs. Dollar amounts in 2012 dollars.
5.3. General Program Costs
For a comparison of the major Federal program costs, see Table 2. The data comes from pp. 13-14
of [US Treasury 2011] and shows the cost of general federal functions as dollars and a percentage
of GDP. Social Security is 20% of 2011 federal spending, less than that spent on health programs,
similar to that for defense, and 22% more than spent on income security. Using the TR percentage
increase in GDP share of 5.0% to 6.1% out to the horizon, this would represent a spending increase
to $929B by Treasury’s accounting. This would make OASDI 24% of the increased total outlay, all
else the same. So it would take about the same percentage of the budget as health does now.
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Category Cost (B$) %GDP %Spending
Health & Medicare $858 5.64% 24%
Social Security $731 4.80% 20%
National Defense $708 4.65% 20%
Income Security $599 3.93% 17%
All Other $702 4.61% 19%
Total $3,598
GDP $15,231
Table 2. Federal spending on programs in 2011.
The projected increase in OASDI cost can also be compared to past increases in national defense
costs. The Census Bureau has a table of defense outlays as a percentage of GDP for various years
from 1960 to 2010 [Census Bureau 2012]. As recently as the 2002-2009 interval, defense outlays
increased by 1.4% of GDP. This is the same maximal OASDI increase, but took place over only 7
years, while the OASDI program will take 23 years. Hence not only is the OASDI program level
commensurate with that of other programs, but its rate of increase is lower. A similar point is
made by the increase in public spending for education, which grew 2.9 percentage points of GDP
from 1950 to 1975, twice the projected increase in OASDI costs over approximately the same period
[NASI 2012].
5.4. OECD Comparison
For a different comparison, consider the level of public pension expenditure as a percent of GDP for
various OECD countries. In [Baily 2009] on p. 9, data shows that US public pension expenditure
was around 4.5% in 2005 and projected to rise to around 6.5% in 2050. By the same measurement,
the OECD average was around 8.5% in 2005 and projected to rise to around 13% in 2050. In
[OECD 2011a] on p. 159, US expenditure was at 4.6% in 2010 and projected to rise to 4.8% in
2050, while the comparable figures for the OECD28 were 8.4% and 11.4%. By both measures, the
projected level of US public pension expenditure in 2050, past and lower than its predicted peak,
is less than the current OECD average. Since the OECD countries have been able to manage their
pensions to date, our burden is clearly manageable.
Consider the total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP for the OECD for 2009 [OECD 2011b]. This
ranges from Mexico at 17.4% to Denmark at 48.1%, with an unweighted average of 33.8%. The US
burden is 24.1%, higher than that of only Mexico and Chile, out of 34 countries. If revenue was
increased by 1% of GDP, to cover the cost of scheduled benefits out to the horizon, the US would
pass only one more country, Turkey. Even with raising taxes to cover scheduled benefits, the US
would remain one of the most lightly taxed countries in the OECD.
5.5. Cash Flow Affordability
The most obvious question for future employees and taxpayers will be the cash flow consequences
of future scheduled benefits, i.e., how much will taxes go up?
Table 1 column 5 gives the projected benefits based on current law, as a percentage of projected
taxable income, from TR table VI.F2 (TR p. 192). The percentage of taxable income represents
the combined employer and employee rate necessary to fund the entire cost for that year. Taxable
income was the first $106,800 for each employee in 2011, at a rate of 12.4% (TR p. 6-7). Note that
the temporary employee payroll tax reduction does not affect SSA revenue, as the uncollected tax is
made up by Treasury (TR p. 6). This peaks at 17.98% in 2090, meaning the employee share would
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be 8.99% instead of the current 6.2%, an increase of 2.79 percentage points. If the Medicare rate
were to remain the same as now, the employee would be paying 10.44% instead of the current 7.65%
(absent the temporary reduction). So if the payroll tax rate is adjusted to meet costs, the additional
payroll tax in 2012 dollars, for a worker making $50,000 per year, would be about $560 in 2021,
$1,150 in 2030 and $1,395 in 2090. This would be an average increase of around $60/year through
2030, and around $4/year thereafter. Even this simple approach, maintaining the regressive payroll
in its current form, would seem to be manageable.
Now consider using the income tax to make up the payroll tax shortfall, exactly what is being done
now and will be done until the TF runs out. Consider the 2010 data, from [SSA 2011], as this
corresponds to IRS income tax data availability [Dungan 2012]. The total OASDI program cost for
2010 was $713B with non-interest income of $664B. The payroll tax income is at a rate of 12.4%, so
the approximate taxable payroll is $5,355B. The shortfall for 2010 was $49B. Using the maximum
OASDI cost as a percentage of taxable payroll, in 2090, of 17.98%, this would imply a maximum
shortfall of $299B, in 2010 dollars. In 2010 the federal income tax liability was $987B. Hence in 2010,
4.96% of the federal income tax liability went to fund OASDI payments, and in 2090 the liability
would need to be about 25% higher than the 2010 level to fund the complete shortfall. However, this
figure does not fairly represent the burden. The total Adjusted Gross Income for 2010 was $8,045B
while the taxable income was $5,459B. So the additional shortfall for the 2090 rate ($250B) would
amount to 3.11% of AGI and 4.58% of taxable income.
More generally, current taxable income is about the same as current taxable payroll, and together
these two taxes make up most of federal revenues (82.4% in 2011, [JCT 2011]). So the additional
revenue needed (above the current shortfall) for the peak cost is around two and a quarter percent
of the combined income and payroll tax base.
Note also that the income tax figures are for a period of recession. In 2010 the income tax liability
increased 8.4% from 2009. The liability represented 18% of taxable income, so in one year alone the
income tax take increased by 1.5% of taxable income. So the increase in income tax would appear
manageable.
5.6. Affordability Using an Alternate Payroll Tax Base
One of the arguments against allowing the income tax to be used (at least visibly) to fund OASDI
benefits is that this weakens the link between taxes and benefits. This has been aimed against the
temporary payroll tax reduction. The question is whether future scheduled benefits can be made
more affordable while using only payroll taxes. An obvious option is to remove the contribution
cap, but not change the benefit schedule. This would have the beneficial side effect of making the
payroll tax less regressive. (It would be flat on covered income only; since higher earners have more
non-covered income, the payroll tax would still be regressive across all income.)
There are three sources of information on the effects of removal of the contribution cap. The first
would be to assume that the OASDI contribution base becomes the same as the HI base. On p.
189 of the TR, the differences between the OSADI and HI wage bases are briefly described, and
involve a larger pool of workers under HI, so the difference is not solely the lack of an HI cap. So
even with keeping the benefit cap, system costs may expand if the pool were increased. But as a
crude comparison, the report states that “the HI taxable payroll is about 26 percent larger than the
OASDI taxable payroll throughout the long-range period.” So column 6 of Table 1 simply divides
column 5 by 1.26, giving the combined employer/employee contribution rate required to cover costs
assuming the same base as the HI program.
For the second source, consider the coverage rate as described on pp. 134-137 of the TR. This is
the percentage of all covered wages that is at or below the cap. This was 88.1% in 1984, 82.5% in
2000, and 83.9% in 2010. The 2012 TR estimates a rate of 82.5% for 2021, and states that this is
the same as estimated in the 2011 TR ([SSA 2011], pp. 114-155). However, the published figure was
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82.9% for 2020, and then was predicted to remain steady out to the horizon. If we assume that the
2012 TR rate of 82.5% holds steady, removal of the contribution cap with no other changes would
lead to payroll tax income about 21% higher over the long term. (This is unchanged if the 2011 TR
steady-state figure of 82.9% is used.) Column 7 of Table 1 shows the resulting contribution rates.
The OASDI rate would drop 0.97 percentage points immediately, would return to current levels
sometime before 2025, and would climb to 2.46 percentage points over the current in 2090. Hence in
2090 the employee would be paying 1.23% of wages in payroll tax over the current level. At $50,000
annual salary, this would be $615/year (2012 dollars).
Finally, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) examined this issue, described in [Mulvey 2010].
The conclusion in the summary (p. 2) is that “If all earnings were subject to the payroll tax, but
the base was retained for benefit calculations, the Social Security Trust Funds would remain solvent
for the next 75 years.”
Clearly, the payroll tax alone can be made to cover the entire cost with modest tax increases to all
but the highest earners, and with a tax reduction on earners under the cap for the next 20 years.
Further, eliminating the cap would make the payroll tax less regressive. The CRS report adds the
caveat “However, having different bases for contributions and benefits would weaken the traditional
link between the taxes workers pay into the system and the benefits they receive.” How much this
would weaken the link is debatable, as the link has never been linear ([Altman 2005], p. 82). There
are currently two bend points (see TR p. 111), and earnings over about $55,000/year have only a
15% replacement rate. Leaving the cap for benefits would simply add a third bend point, with a
0% replacement rate above the cap, resulting in a replacement rate progression of 90, 32, 15 and
0%. An alternative would be to add a fourth bend point for 0%, out at a level where there is no
sympathy ($250,000?), and have a very low replacement rate between that and the current cap.
Further evidence against the strength of this link in the public view is provided by a National
Academy of Social Insurance survey from 2009 [Reno 2009]. When asked about willingness to
pay (Table 7), 87% were willing “because it provides security and stability to millions of retired
Americans, the disabled, and the children and widowed spouses of deceased workers,” while only
72% were willing because “I know that I will be receiving the benefits when I retire.” There is
clearly an attitude of contributing to others instead of just ones self, which can be done in any tax
form. When asked which of various options they supported for raising revenue (Table 8), removing
the tax cap got the largest agreement, 83% and the smallest do not know, 1%. This would indicate
people favor extending the tax to the more wealthy over maintaining the current level of linkage,
although the report did not make clear how well the respondents understood the caps.
5.7. Stimulus
A final argument for affordability is to consider whether it is affordable (to the economy) to not
continue paying scheduled benefits after the TF run-out date. With OASDI benefits to be at around
6% of GDP and the payroll tax shortfall to be around 25%, cutting benefits would be a transfer of
1.5% of GDP from retirees to those paying the income tax. This could be significant depending on
the relative propensity to spend of the two groups. This will not be analyzed in detail here, but a
rough case can be made by considering that the income tax will go primarily to higher earners who
save more, while most older people spend most of their income. This means that maintaining the
status quo would constitute some level of stimulus compared to cutting benefits. The spending of
old-age benefits can be considered from two viewpoints.
First, a significant number of people find their Social Security benefits to be essential, many more
than thought so prior to retirement. In EBRI’s 2011 Retirement Confidence Survey ([Helman 2011],
p. 33), 33% of workers expect Social Security to be major source of income, and an additional 45%
expect it to be a minor source. However, among retirees 68% state that it is a major source, and
23% a minor one. The Kaiser Family Foundation 2005 Social Security Knowledge Poll ([KFF 2005])
14
found that 51% of retirees said that Social Security was their largest source of income. An analysis of
the 2010 Current Population Survey by the Institute for Women’s Policy Research [Hartmann 2011]
shows that for men and women 65 and over, 56% and 67% of their income on average, respectively,
comes from Social Security. Since the OASDI program was intended to cover only a portion of
retirement income requirements, and since many people are surprised by how little else they have,
the fact that it is a major or largest source for most people would imply that it is mostly being spent
on essential goods and services rather than being saved.
The other viewpoint is to consider expenditures by households aged 65 and over. In [BLS 2011] the
Consumer Expenditure Survey data for 2010 shows that that for this age group, 78% of expenditures
went to food, housing, transportation, healthcare, and apparel and services. In [Lafrance 2011], using
Canadian cohorts entering their late sixties and early seventies, the consumption to income ratio is
between 0.96 and 0.98, so almost all their income is being spent. 85% to 88% of this consumption
was for essential categories similar to those used in the BLS data. In [Butrica 2005] data from the
Health and Retirement Study is used. For ages 65-74, the expenditure to after-tax income ratio is
0.81, and for 75 and over the ratio is 0.91. For ages 65 and over, essential categories are 76% of
expenditures. This percentage is in the 70’s for all income quintiles. So it is clear that people in the
retirement age range are spending most of their income, and of that, most is being spent on essential
goods and services.
6. Conclusion
The OASDI Trust Fund is a misrepresentation of its own concept. It is not a trust fund in the
traditional sense as it does not perform the essential function of maintaining a payment stream in
the event of collapse of the original source of the funds. It contains no assets that can independently
produce income; the special bonds in the TF should be considered budget authority or chits instead.
The ultimate source of OASDI payments is the US economy, tapped through a combination of the
payroll and income taxes. The TF serves only to alter the distribution between the two and limit
access to the latter. If the economy cannot provide sufficient funds to make scheduled payments in
the future, the payments will not be made, with or without the TF.
Public discourse indicates that people do not understand this. Reassurance that the TF is sound
is a claim that it has an independent fiscal significance. Survey questions concerning the state of
Social Security rather than the moral issue of whether to fund scheduled benefits indicate the same
problem: the universe of discourse is on the soundness of a trust fund that cannot be sound or
unsound. The responses to survey questions indicate that people believe the system is unsound, and
that they miss the political nature of the payment decision.
By various measures, the increased revenue to fund scheduled benefits out to the horizon is easily
manageable. This is the case even if the existing payroll tax structure is kept in place, with the rate
adjusted as necessary. This is true on a cash flow basis, which will be the concern of workers. All else
the same, in 2090, the peak year within the horizon, a worker would be paying an additional 2.79%
of covered income in order to fully fund benefits as currently scheduled. By keeping everything
the same except for the rate, and dropping the contribution cap, the maximum increase would be
1.23% of wages, in 2090. This is clearly manageable, although still regressive. If the payroll tax
rate were frozen at the current 12.4% and the contributions cap lifted, the balance at the peak cost
could be made up by the federal income tax for an additional 2% of taxable income, based on 2010
parameters. This would fall mainly on higher earners.
The peak scheduled benefits are similarly manageable from the point of view of overall burden. The
peak cost as a percentage of GDP occurs in 2035, at 1.35% higher than current. This estimated peak
percentage is below the current average pension percentage for the OECD. So the peak burden is
clearly manageable by comparison.
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The debate over the TF and its solvency therefore misses the point. As a tax-funded pay-as-you-go
system, there is no concept of bankruptcy. The “solvency” of the TF as a store of assets is the same
as the health of the US economy, since all funds provided by the TF come immediately and directly
from the economy. So the only real issue is what to do around 2033 when the TF “runs out,” causing
the SSA to lose budget authority to tap the income tax for revenue. Under current law, the payroll
tax will only be adequate for around 75% of then scheduled benefits. Raising taxes to cover the full
scheduled benefit level is clearly a viable option. Hence, the debate must be over whether to do this,
or more generally, what mix of tax increases and benefit cuts should be made to bring the two into
balance. This is strictly a moral and political issue, far removed from a discussion of asset solvency.
The current misunderstanding of the TF leaves the possibility that its continued existence may
continue to cloud the debate, and be used to justify program changes that would not be acceptable
if the program was properly understood. This is an argument for abandoning the TF completely.
An easier and probably more palatable option would be to re-institute full recourse to Treasury for
any future shortfall, as was the case during the 1940’s. This would mean that any time the TF
is running low, Treasury would supply funds by any convenient method. In effect nothing would
change, as this would mean supplying general revenue (ultimately from the income tax), exactly as
is happening right now. The only difference would be that this recourse would be unlimited, whereas
now the TF “balance” specifies a limit to total income tax liability. This would mean that OASDI
payments would be defined by the benefit schedule rather than the revenue schedule. Then, the
Social Security debate would immediately shift to “what part of the scheduled benefits should be
paid,” and how to adjust the tax structure to meet the need, which is where the debate needs to be.
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